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The role of American technology in the Western Alliance has
recently become a much-discussed issue. As should have been apparent
long ago, this technology is the basis for America's economic dominance
of the Alliance and, therefore, for its military and political dominance
as well. This connection between technological and political supremacy
has only recently received the public discussion it deserves, largely as
a result of the economic hardships facing the British airframe and
shipbuilding industries.'
In the early 1950's, federal government agencies began dispensing
the funds that fed American industrial and academic research. Today,
the expenditure of billions of dollars for research is a fixture of the
annual federal budget. New technologies have grown from the confines
of their initial military environment, and thousands of American "new-
technology" firms are now applying the fruits of their sponsored re-
search to commercial products and services. The Western Alliance
relies increasingly on this new American industry for support and
technological progress. Reliance on American industry for most of the
know-how behind the new technologies poses a serious threat to the
European partners in the Alliance. It seems that only de Gaulle has
had the foresight to realize that, today, technological independence is
the key to economic and political independence.' Gaullist "go-it-alone"
policies, particularly France's independent nuclear force, supersonic
aircraft and space programs, have lessened French dependence on
American technology.' The cost has been great, and much enmity has
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1 The Aerospace Industry Situation, 20 Interavia 1373 (1965).
- 
2 See, e.g., Address by General Charles de Gaulle, quoted in 149 Science 1217
(1965):
To safeguard our independence—economic, scientific, technical—we must
ensure that our activities remain under French direction and administration, even
though we confront the enormous wealth of certain countries and although we
will not refuse to carry out all kinds of exchanges with them. Likewise, we
must support, no matter what the cost, those activities which assure the value,
the autonomy, the very life of all our industry, those sectors which require the
most research, experiment and sophisticated tools or which need the largest team
of scientists, technicians and workers of the highest quality. Finally, when it
is opportune in a selected branch to join our inventions and money and skills
with those of another country, we must choose the country nearest to us and
whose weight could not crush us.
3 French Avionics Industry Expands in Size and Diversity, Aviation Week and Space
Technology, June 14, 1965, p. 118; French Nationalism vs. U.S. Technology, id. at 120.
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been incurred; 4 but French airframe employment is up, the French
aerospace industry has blossomed, Paris is now the center of Europe's
space efforts, and France is America's major rival in international arms
trade.8
There are signs of American recognition of the problem confront-
ing its allies and the Alliance. The recent visit of Secretary of Defense
McNamara to England was presumably made to allay British concern.
As a step in this direction, some American military ship orders may
soon be placed with British shipyards, despite the fact that the gov-
ernors of several states have lodged public protests. The late Adlai
Stevenson, in his recent magnificent commencement address at Harvard,
maintained that:
. . . Our best policy is, I think, on the one hand, to keep our
defense commitment to Europe unequivocal and to explore
all reasonable ways of transferring greater responsibility to
them by joint purchasing, by joint burden-sharing, by our
readiness to consider any pattern of cooperation that Euro-
peans care to suggest.°
A logical beginning for the implementation of Mr. Stevenson's
suggestion is the relatively limited NATO market place. Small NATO
procurements, generally . for construction and supplies, fall within
NATO's Infrastructure Program, and are open to international bid-
ding from NATO country firms.' However, the large multi-million
dollar procurements of weaponry, planes and tanks are placed after
high-level negotiations between defense and other governmental offi-
cials, in which the American presence naturally dominates.
An even more basic method of curing the stifling effect of American
technological dominance, however, would be a revision of the "Buy-
American" Act,8
 a little-publicized statute, passed by Congress in 1933,
which remains as today's major protectionist barrier favoring United
States industry. "Buy-American," straightforwardly entitled "Ameri-
can Materials Required for Public Use," was an anti-depression
measure passed in the first Roosevelt administration. It provides simply
that
. only such unmanufactured articles, materials, and supplies
as have been mined or produced in the United States, and only
such manufactured articles, materials, and supplies as have
4 Is French Scientific Policy Chauvinist? 149 Science 1216 (1965).
5 N.Y. Times, May 24, 1965, p. 1, col. 5.
0 Boston Herald, June 18, 1965, p. 1, col. 3.
7 Gov't Cont. Rep. 111 4045, 4048.






been manufactured in the United States substantially all from
articles, materials, or supplies mined, produced, or manu-
factured, as the case may be, in the United States, shall be
acquired for public use
Four exceptions to this general rule are noted:
This section shall not apply with respect to articles . . . for use
outside the United States, or if articles ... of the class or kind
to be used or the articles, materials, or supplies from which
they are manufactured are not mined, produced, or manufac-
tured . . . in the United States in ... reasonably available
commercial quantities and of a satisfactory quality."
The act also states that the general rule applies "unless the head of
the [federal] department or independent establishment concerned
shall determine it to be inconsistent with the public interest, or the
cost' to be unreasonable.""
The history of the act is one of continually increasing significance.
At the time of its passage, Government procurement and, indeed, the
federal budget itself, were relatively minor factors in both the Ameri-
can economy and international trade. Further, during the following
decade of war preparation and effort, American economic policy was,
of necessity, protectionist.
In the years following 1945, national trade barriers began to fall,
largely at American instigation, and an Atlantic community of interests
was conceived and implemented. The Buy-American Act became, for
a time, an anachronism and an embarrassing legacy to post-war ad-
ministrations. Nevertheless, its self-interest philosophy was applied
in various foreign aid programs. As much as seventy per cent of the
Marshall Plan funds provided European countries were tied to the
purchase of American supplies; and eighty per cent of the commit-
ments made by the Agency for International Development to foreign
countries today similarly require the procurement of United States
goods and services. 12
In the early 1950's, the act itself was "rediscovered" and invoked
by important segments of American industry which realized that they
had a strong potential weapon against a revived and highly com-
petitive European industry. Today, the act applies to virtually all





 Letter From Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon to Senator Hugh Scott,
June 8, 1964.
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budget, and is thereby 'a major factor in the national and international
economies.
The "rediscovery" of the act occurred when several federal
agencies, including the Tennessee Valley Authority, sought to buy
heavy electrical equipment by means of the normal federal procure-
ment practice of formal advertising. The formal advertising procedure
consists of the solicitation of bids and award of the contract to the
lowest bidder who is both responsive to the specifications of the
solicitation document and responsible in terms of management and
plant. Low bids for several procurements came from qualified British
and Japanese firms, and awards of the contracts to them would have
resulted in a saving of millions of dollars to the federal government.
American firms in each case sought strict application of the Buy-Ameri-
can Act by raising the spectre of the irreparable damage which allegedly
would result to important segments of American industry as well as
the detrimental effect such awards would have on national security.
Despite convincing proof to the contrary offered by the federal agencies
concerned, the American firms raised sufficient political support to win
awards of the procurements to domestic businesses.'
Not until the late 1950's, when liberal trade attitudes had gained
ground in Washington, were federal agencies able to buy such goods
from low-bidding foreign firms. An unpublished executive branch study
has since reported that the savings from turbine orders placed with
British and Japanese firms in 1959 and 1960 approximated some $19
million.14 Two other aspects of the turbine procurements subsequently
came to light. In 1958, the Comptroller General reported to Congress
that the Tennessee Valley Authority, which had been stymied in its
efforts to buy from foreign sources, had experienced major technical
difficulties and financial damage with domestic steam turbine gen-
erators.' This was followed by the largest price-fixing conspiracy
uncovered by the United States Department of Justice, involving the
same American firms that had so successfully invoked the Buy-
American Act." The evidence, thus, is convincing that "Buy-American"
is not always in the best interests of the nation. Nevertheless, the act
has recently been embellished and implemented so that it is more
effective than ever.
As mentioned, the original act is brief and to the point, simply
stating that only United States-made goods . will, be purchased with
federal funds unless such goods are to be used outside the country
13 See N.Y. Times, April 17, 1953, p. 17, col. 1 ; J. of Commerce, April 16, 1953, p. 1,
col. 6.
14 See Knapp, The Buy-American Act, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 430 (1961).




(offshore procurement and overseas base supplies), or the goods are
not available from domestic sources, or the price of the American
goods is unreasonable, or if it is determined at Secretarial level that
the best interests of the United States are served by purchasing such
goods from foreign sources.
To provide guidelines for federal agencies and thereby promote
uniformity of federal policy, a 1954 Executive order set forth "Uniform
Procedures for Certain Determinations" regarding the permissibility
of foreign purchases." The order provides that goods are foreign in
origin if the costs of the foreign materials used in the end product
constitute fifty per cent or more of the total cost of all products used
in the finished item, without considering assemblage or manufacturing
costs which are incurred in the United States and may constitute most
of the final cost of the item. As a result of this order, an administrative
board has determined that nails manufactured in the United States
of only one component, Belgian wire, were foreign goods and could
not be purchased unless one of the four exceptions applied in the
case."
In addition, the largest federal purchaser, the Department of
Defense, provides that the transportation costs and import duties
of foreign materials and compOnents are to be included in totalling
costs and determining the "source" of the end item." As a result, a
recent procurement of lime packed in pails from an American firm was
halted because it was found that the end item was "foreign." 2° The
lime was imported, and its cost including duties and transportation
to the American firm came to $1.40 per end item. The only other
components were the domestically-produced pails costing eighty cents
each. Packaging costs, labor and overhead incurred in the United
States were not considered in determining the "source" of the end
item. Therefore, $1.40 of the total component cost of $2.20 per end
item was for foreign components; the end item was from a "foreign
source" and, hence, was ineligible for procurement unless one of the
four statutory exceptions applied. It should also be noted that com-
ponents are "foreign" even if furnished by the foreign subsidiary of
an American firm.
The Executive order also defines as an "unreasonable price" for
an American product, one exceeding the bid price of a like foreign item,
including its shipping and duty costs, by six per cent of the bid price
17 Uniform Procedures for Determination, Exec. Order No. 10582, 19 Fed. Reg. 8723
(1954).
18 Comp. Gen. Op. No. B-154501 (1964).
18 41 C.F.R. § 1-6.101 (1965).
20 Comp. Gen. Op. No. B-152352 (1963).
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of the foreign item." The percentage handicap favoring American
items has been raised to twelve per cent if the domestic goods are to
be supplied by a firm located in an area designated by the Department
of Labor as one of substantial unemployment, or if the United States
supplier is deemed to be a "small business" within the regulations of
the Small Business Administration.22 A "small business" is generally
one employing less than five hundred people, that is not dominant in
its field, and is independently owned and *rated.'
The Department of Defense, in a burst of zeal prompted by the
continuing "gold outflow," has gone far beyond the guidelines sug-
gested in the order, which are followed by all other agencies. Since
the Department's annual budget is half the total federal budget of
$100 billion, the departure is significant. In a memorandum dated
July 16, 1962,24
 Secretary McNamara directed that procurements by
the Department's contracting offices that will result in dollar expendi-
tures outside the United States shall be held to an absolute minimum,
and may be made only in the following cases: (1) Procurements re-
quired to be made pursuant to a treaty or executive agreement between
governments; (2) procurements estimated not to exceed $500; (3)
procurements estimated not to exceed $10,000 required by compelling
emergencies; (4) procurement of perishable subsistence items; and
(5) procurements as to which it is determined in advance that the
requirements can only be filled by foreign supplies or services. Such a
determination must be made by various designated officials, depending
upon the total dollar amount involved. The memorandum further
provides that
... (1) when it is estimated that the price delivered from US
sources will not exceed $10,000, procurement shall be re-
stricted to domestic source end products, or services of do-
mestic concerns without regard to possible price differentials,
and (2) such procurements which are estimated to exceed
$10,000 shall be similarly restricted provided that the cost
of domestic source end products or services . . . is estimated
to be not more than 50 percent in excess of the cost of foreign
21 Or, in the alternative:
The sum determined by computing ten per centum of the bid or offered price
of materials of foreign origin exclusive of applicable duty and all costs incurred
after arrival in the United States: provided that when the bid or offered price
of materials of foreign origin amounts to less than $25,000, the sum shall be
determined by computing ten per centum of such price exclusive only of ap-
plicable duty.
Exec. Order No. 10582, supra note 17.
22 This is a result of internal agency practices.
23 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.701-1 (1965).
24




supplies or services . . . .	 f the estimated or actual cost
differential exceeds 50 percent, the matter shall be referred to
the Secretary of Defense for determination. (Emphasis sup-
plied.)'
The real impact of this memorandum is felt in those situations where
the procurement is expected to exceed $10,000 and both foreign and
domestic gdods are available. In such cases, the foreign goods must
be less than two-thirds the price of the American goods to reach the
point of even being considered for procurement. As a result, few
foreign firms can expect to be awarded Department of Defense con-
tracts for supplies or services.
The 1954 Executive order provided finally that the agencies can
reject any bid "to protect essential national-security interests" or
"for reasons of the national interest not described or referred to in
this order." This open-end clause has unfortunately resulted in a
diversity of criteria which the order sought to prevent, such as the
Department of Defense memorandum which has been cited.
Policing the sources of components and materials used by Ameri-
can firms has naturally proven a difficult task. The usual method is to
require that each prospective American contractor certify, before award
of a contract, the amount of foreign source components and materials
which he intends to use in the performance of his work. Justification
for such foreign subcontracting is required, and the certification be-
comes a part of the terms of the contract. Prime contractors, in turn,
require similar certification from significant subcontractors. Breach
by the prime or subcontractor of the certification terms can result
in contractor debarment—ineligibility for future work for a period
of several years. 26
 Upon such a breach, the contractor is not entitled
to the stipulated contract price, but only, at best, to payment on a
quantum valebat basis."
Contracts for research, while not clearly within the scope of the
act and 1954 Order, nevertheless are rarely awarded competitively
to foreign firms. The Department of Defense has directed that research
and development contracting outside the United States should be held
to an absolute minimum and be undertaken only pursuant to treaty
obligations or if the research could not be performed in this country.
Additionally, security, quality control and administrative require-
ments preclude consideration of foreign firms in many cases.
Other relevant federal regulations allow the purchase of specified
raw materials, from antimony to vanilla beans, from almost any
25 Ibid.
20
 32 C.F.R. § 1.6 (1965).
27
 Comp. Gen. Op. No. B-141911 (1960).
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source;" but no purchase of these or any other items for public use
can be made from Soviet-controlled areas, including by some stretch of
the imagination China and Albania." Canadian-American relations
are favored by provisions that certain Canadian materials and goods
should be listed by the agencies and regarded for procurement pur-
poses as American and, hence, not subject to the price differentials and
strictures of the Buy-American Act.3° Finally, the Berry Amendment,
incorporated into the Defense Department's procurement regulations,
provides that no Department funds can be used to buy food, clothing,
cotton, silk or wool not grown, reprocessed, reused or produced in the
United States unless such items are not available in the United States,
or are needed for emergencies or combat."
Despite these obstacles to foreign firms, federal contracts continu-
ally are awarded to firms such as Rolls-Royce for their high-quality
aircraft engines and to Martin-Baker for the ejection seat used in
virtually all American aircraft. Some $50 million in American funds
have been awarded to British firms for research and development of
the V/STOL aircraft and engines because of the British leadership in
this new technology." The Army continues to buy antibiotics from
Italian firms at a price below the low American bid, despite the fact
that the Italians are accused by the American pharmaceutical industry
of infringing American-held patents. Thus far, administrative decisions
have upheld the Army procurements," probably because the Federal
Trade Commission has leveled price-fixing charges against several
American firms for their activities in the commercial pharmaceutical
market.
A 1963 study of foreign procurement by federal agencies com-
piled by the Bureau of the Budget" indicates that contracts placed
by all agencies with foreign firms because of the unreasonable cost of
domestic goods and services totalled $25 to $30 million per year in
the years 1960, 1961, and 1962. And contracts placed in those years
with foreign firms, on the basis of the nonavailability in this country
of like items or services approximated another $140 million annually.
Nonavailability of domestic items was, therefore, the primary cause
for foreign procurement. For this reason, the Bureau of the Budget
study concluded that various suggestions for further reducing foreign
procurement, such as raising price differentials for all agencies to
28 32 C.F.R. § 6.105 (1965).
29 32 C.F.R. §§ 6.401-1, -2 (1965).
80 32 C.F.R. § 6.103-5 (1965).
31 32 C.F.R. § 6.304-1 (1965).
32
 Fed. Cont. Rep., No. 45, Dec. 28, 1964, p. A-7.
" Comp. Gen. Op. No. B-141459 (1960).
84




twenty-five per cent, were impractical and would result in additional
cost to the Government." The problem of foreign competition for
federal contracts would seem to be a negligible one for American
industry, since less than two per cent of the total dollars spent annually
by federal agencies goes to foreign firms.
With so little opportunity to sell to the biggest customer in the
world, science-based industry in Western Europe is forced to eke
out support from its own governments, which are concerned with
cutting costs and which buy much of their military hardware from
American companies. To encourage this advantageous relationship,
the Department of Defense has appointed a Deputy Assistant Sec-
retary for International Logistics Negotiation, Henry Kuss, Jr. Kuss
aids the United States defense industry in selling its products over-
seas. He has been provided with a $1.5 billion credit insurance fund
to support export sales." Last year, sales reached $1.4 billion, and
Kuss was commended by Secretary McNamara at a special ceremony.
This maximization of exports offsets much of the gold outflow result-
ing from the support of American troops overseas. But as a recent New
York Times headline ("U.S. Leads World in Sale of Arms") illus-
trates, this "success" has its dubious aspects as well."
For America to grant a greater share of its "new-technology"
research and hardware procurement to non-American firms would be
a selfless deed of heroic proportions, for governments at all times have
favored domestic sources, often to a greater degree than does current
United States policy. A State Department study of foreign procure-
ment policies of member countries of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development indicates that few have defined their
"buy national" policies as clearly and as publicly as has America. They
rely instead on unpublished, confidentially-placed procurements with
national sources, cumbersome administrative requirements, and closed
supplier lists."
A more generous American attitude at NATO negotiations and a
revision or revocation of "Buy-American" principles are possible, but
depend on several factors. The President and Secretary of Defense
must be willing to act, despite the public outcry of American aero-
space and defense firms and their groupings, such as the National
Security Industries Association, the military personnel of the De-
partment of Defense, labor unions, and congressional representatives.
The American public must also appreciate the essential fairness of the
situation. There is joint burden-sharing among the allies, and, therefore,
35 Id. at 16.
28
 Defense Department Does its Bit, Business Week, May 8, 1965, p. 82.
a7 N.Y. Times, supra note 5.
28
 Bureau of the Budget, supra note 34.
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there should be joint sharing of the technological and economic bene-
fits; further, "Buy-American" does not always work in the public
interest.
The increasing role that new technology plays in the national
economies of this country and its allies, the need for economic inde-
pendence, and the equities of the situation all demand a diminution,of
the "Buy-American" philosophy. Otherwise, de Gaulle's example will
not be difficult for America's other allies to follow." As the advertise-
ments of Premier Precision Ltd. have put it so clearly in London
newspapers: "The United States Sells Defense Products to Us—but,
they Will Not Buy from us I"4°
80
 The TechnOlogical "Spin-off" (editorial), N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1965, p. 42, col. I.
40 The Observer, London, Sept. 20, 1964, p. 4, cols. 1-3. Another example:
Friends, Patrons, Patriots, lend us a drum—of your ear ... Listen I . . . The
roaring flood of increasing technological imports from abroad—which can be
made far better and much cheaper in Britain—mutes the Boom of Britain's
car exports to a mere whisper. The absurd sound made by our trivial share of
the vast equipment contracts which arm N.A.T.O., C.E.N.T.O., S.E.A.T.O.: our
diminishing share of Commonwealth and world trade ; the enormous volume of
misguided and perverse purchases of U.S. aircraft, technological devices and
electronic Systems annually multiplied by obligatory expenditure upon expensive
spare parts and costly maintenance are the basic cause of such discordant harsh
warning notes within our Economy. All very sweet music to the expanding
giant industries of our most powerful trade rival ... .
. . . . Remember, all contracts placed with British companies pay taxes to the
British Exchequer—which cures inflation I . Stagnation 1 . . . Technical
Frustration I ... and, even Brainpower Emigration I
Id., Sept. 26, 1964, p. 4, cols. 1-4.
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